I have often discussed the benefits of mootness as a defense in Title III ADA cases. Simply fix the problem and the plaintiff’s right to sue evaporates. Unfortunately, not all problems can be easily or cheaply fixed, leaving the defendant in the unpleasant position of having to spend an absurd amount of money or make an irritating settlement that pays the plaintiff’s lawyer to give up the claim. When the cost to fix a problem is high, the “readily achievable” standard in the ADA comes into play and can help the defendant.
ADA FHA Litigation General
Contribution, Indemnity and Disability – Does the FHA make sense?
By Richard Hunt in ADA FHA Litigation General, ADA indemnity contribution, FHA indemnity contribution, Residential Development Tags: AECOM, Cherokee Meadows, Equal Rights Center, FHA contribution, FHA enforcement, FHA Indemnity, non-delegable duty
Last week’s decision in Shaw v. Cherokee Meadows, LP, 17-CV-610-GKF-JFJ, 2018 WL 3474082 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2018) provides a good opportunity to revisit contribution and indemnity claims arising out failures to meet the design/build requirements in Section 3604(f)(3)(C) of the Fair Housing Act.* The question remains the same as always: does the law make any sense at all.**
The judge who decided Cherokee Meadows was faced with a split between two Circuit Courts of Appeal and no precedent from the Tenth Circuit, which Oklahoma is a part of. The leading case on contribution and indemnity in design/build cases was Equal Rights Center v. Niles Bolton Associates, 602 F.3d 597, 602 (4th Cir. 2010). In that case the Fourth Circuit held that the Fair Housing Act pre-empted any state law that might allow an owner to put off all or even part of the liability for design/build failures on a third party. The Court found that the owner had a “non-delegable duty”† to follow the law and that allowing any shifting of liability would encourage owners to evade that duty. Equal Rights Center punishes an owner who may be innocent while excusing those who are in fact guilty because, it appears, the Fourth Circuit views the purpose of the FHA as primarily punitive.‡ More
Quick Hits – April is the cruelest month edition
By Richard Hunt in ADA, ADA - drive-by litigation, ADA - serial litigation, ADA - Standing, ADA FHA Litigation General, ADA Internet, ADA Internet Web, ADA Litigation Procedure, FHA, Internet Accessibility Tags: ADA standing, Fair Housing Act, Group Homes, internet accessibility, Quick Hits, World Wide Web
April is the cruellest month according to T.S. Eliot†, but it was really just busy for my practice and the courts. Here’s part one of our update on important decisions in the ADA and FHA world. We expect to be caught up after a long weekend of blogging and a couple of additional installments. More
Quick Hits – Vernal Equinox edition.
By Richard Hunt in Accessibility Litigation Trends, ADA - serial litigation, ADA FHA Litigation General
Along with the crocus and narcissus we’ve got a bunch of new ADA and FHA cases, each with some interest for those in business concerned with disability law.
Website Accessibility
In Gathers v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 17-CV-10273-IT, 2018 WL 839381, at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2018) the defendant raised just about as many legal defenses as might be available in a motion to dismiss, but they all failed. Behind the failure is the difficulty present in all ADA cases; that is, the plaintiff’s allegations are really all that matters at the beginning of the case. In many cases the most cost-effective strategy is to remediate as needed to meet the plaintiff’s claims and then file a Motion for Summary Judgment. First Fix, Then Fight is our motto and the best game plan in most ADA cases. More
Obvious but often overlooked – it takes more than an impairment to be disabled under the ADA (or FHA)
By Richard Hunt in Accessibility Litigation Trends, ADA, ADA FHA General, ADA FHA Litigation General, ADA regulations, Definition of disability, FHA definition of handicap, Uncategorized Tags: ADA, Alcoholism, disability, FHA, Major life activity
The March 13 decision in Johnson v. NYS Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse, 1:16-cv-9769 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 2018) shouldn’t be particularly interesting. The plaintiff claimed to be disabled because he was a recovering alcoholic. The Court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff did not allege that his alcoholism interfered with a major life activity, explaining:
Although alcoholism is considered an ” impairment” under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act , “more than a physical or mental impairment is required ” to satisfy the definition of “disability. ” Because ” [m]ere status as an alcohol or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a limitation under the anti-discrimination statutes, a plaintiff who alleges that he is disabled “must demonstrate not only that he . . . was actually addicted to drugs or alcohol in the past, but also that this addiction substantially limits one or more of his . . . major life activities. ” (quoting an earlier case). More