Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Transunion¹ and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Laufer v Mann Hospitality,² challenging the standing of a Fair Housing Act tester in Texas has been a hit or miss proposition depending very much on which District Judge decided the case. It has been quite possible to file almost identical motions to dismiss concerning almost identical complaints and get opposite results. The underlying uncertainty has several sources. First, the only attorney actively filing FHA tester cases in Texas, Eric Calhoun, has gathered a substantial list of decisions denying motions to dismiss based on standing, and while a decision by one district judge does not bind the others, it is hard for any district judge to simply ignore a dozen decisions by their peers. Added to this is the lack of circuit level authority on FHA standing. Transunion was not an FHA case and neither was Laufer v. Mann Hospitality, making it easy to argue that FHA cases are different, especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman is the leading case on tester standing and was decided under the FHA. It has been widely misunderstood and misused, but it certainly supports an argument that a plaintiff tester can have standing in an FHA case. Finally, the FHA provides a damage remedy and there is some case law suggesting a person with a disability suffers compensable damages by merely encountering an FHA violation. That means even a tester with no intent to rent can at least claim damages. And from it is only a short step from any standing at all to cases suggesting a federal judge has broad power to enter injunctions to cure design and construction violations.
That last step is why Judge Godbey’s decision in Millerborg v. Blue Bonnet Trail LLC, 2025 WL 1994407 (July 16, 2025)³ has the potential to significantly change the prospects for defendants in these cases. The decision begins with the recognition that Laufer v Mann Hospitality is a crucial decision on standing in the Fifth Circuit and then considers the plaintiff’s allegations in light of that case. Judge Godbey ultimately concludes that the plaintiff’s complaint does not include sufficient detail for the Court to determine whether he “personally experienced (as opposed to merely observed)” the various supposed violations he encountered. The difference between experiencing a violation and seeing a violation is crucial because in Laufer v. Mann Hospitality the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that a disabled person might suffer a real harm just from seeing a condition that violated the law. Seeing a gate that is too narrow to meet FHA standards doesn’t cause a harm that gives rise to standing. Being impeded by narrowness of the gate does.
While this is helpful, it is not hard for a tester plaintiff to claim there were at least a few violations that interfered with their access to the property, and Judge Godbey gave the plaintiff in Bluebonnet Trails a chance to amend and be more specific about what he personally experienced. A person who is wheelchair bound can plausibly allege that a gate that does not meet FHA requirements hindered their access to some part of the apartment complex, and that is enough to allege a harm that would give rise to a claim for damages even if the amount were small.
It is the next step in Judge Godbey’s analysis that can change the nature of FHA defense. Turning from past injury to future injury ,Judge Godbey notes that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show a real or immediate threat of future injury in order to get injunctive relief. Millerborg does not claim (because it would not be true) that he wanted to lease an apartment. Without an plausible allegation that he would return in the future and might suffer an injury if things are not fixed Millerborg has failed to allege an immediate threat of a concrete harm. Therefore, according to Judge Godbey, Millerborg failed to plead any claim for injunctive relief.
Once again, Millerborg can amend, but to see why that might not matter it is helpful to look at another decision from a judge in the Northern District of Texas. In Bowman v. SWBC Real Estate Services, Case No. 3:23-cv-00970 (N.D. Texas) I represent a group of defendants. I moved to dismiss the case based on standing, a motion granted by Judge Brantley Starr (4). Judge Starr began by dismissing claims that rested on discrimination in the rental of an apartment for the simple reason that Bowman did not allege an intent to rent. He then went on to consider the broader prohibition on discrimination in 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2). In this analysis Judge Starr distinguished the parts of the apartment complex open to the public and the parts that were intended only for tenants. Areas like the leasing office that were open to the public were “fair game” for a claim by someone like Bowman who never intended to rent. Those that were only for tenants were not, because of course only someone who wanted to rent an apartment would ever care about these areas.
Turning back to Millerborg v. Blue Bonnet Trail, consider what the distinction between areas open to the public and areas only for tenants means in terms of injunctive relief. The threat in FHA design build cases is that the owner will have to spend a fortune on remediation if it turns out that dozens or hundreds of apartment units were all designed or built wrong and must be fixed. The threat represented by the cost of fixing public areas is much smaller, usually involving only a few parking spaces and perhaps one set of restrooms in the leasing office. If a plaintiff like Millerborg is not entitled to injunctive relief related to areas that are only for tenants the threat posed by the lawsuit is relatively small and the claims for injunctive relief can be (usually) made moot at a fairly small expense. That leaves the plaintiff and his attorney pursuing a case that will not justify a huge expenditure on attorney and expert fees and does not pose a huge risk to the defendants. This means the defendant can take the case to trial with a diminished risk of a truly terrible outcome. Being able to take a chance on trial is important because while a motion to dismiss must assume what the plaintiff alleges is true, at trial the plaintiff has to prove the allegations are true. It is one thing to plausibly allege you intend to go back to an a apartment complex when you never intended to rent an apartment. It is quite a different thing to persuade a judge or jury that you really will go back.
The distinction drawn by Judge Starr between areas open to the public and areas only for tenants, combined with Judge Godbey’s holding that a plaintiff is only entitled to injunctive relief with respect to conditions that might cause them harm in the future should lead to the conclusion that in FHA tester cases the possibility of injunctive relief is limited to areas open to the public. That makes the litigation risk manageable. Millerborg v. Blubonnet Trails is still just one district court opinion, but it creates a solid argument that other judges should find persuasive about why a tester may have standing to sue, but does not have standing to seek more than limited injunctive relief.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
¹ See my blog Transunion v Ramirez – has the Supreme Court put an end to cheap standing in ADA litigation? and others you can find by searching for “Transunion”
² See my blog Stigmatic Injury and Laufer v Looper 1 and Laufer v Looper 2.
³ Thanks to Rachel Barlotta of Baker Donelson for calling the case to my attention.
(4) Bowman did file an amended complaint and my motion to dismiss that amended complaint is pending.


