• FHA tester standing – the beginning of the beginning of the end?

    Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Transunion¹ and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Laufer v Mann Hospitality,² challenging the standing of a Fair Housing Act tester in Texas has been a hit or miss proposition depending very much on which District Judge decided the case. It has been quite possible to file almost identical motions to dismiss concerning almost identical complaints and get opposite results. The underlying uncertainty has several sources. First, the only attorney actively filing FHA tester cases in Texas, Eric Calhoun, has gathered a substantial list of decisions denying motions to dismiss based on standing, and while a decision by one district judge does not bind the others, it is hard for any district judge to simply ignore a dozen decisions by their peers. Added to this is the lack of circuit level authority on FHA standing. Transunion was not an FHA case and neither was Laufer v. Mann Hospitality, making it easy to argue that FHA cases are different, especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman is the leading case on tester standing and was decided under the FHA. It has been widely misunderstood and misused, but it certainly supports an argument that a plaintiff tester can have standing in an FHA case. Finally, the FHA provides a damage remedy and there is some case law suggesting a person with a disability suffers compensable damages by merely encountering an FHA violation. That means even a tester with no intent to rent can at least claim damages. And from it is only a short step from any standing at all to cases suggesting a federal judge has  broad power to enter injunctions to cure design and construction violations.

    That last step is why Judge Godbey’s decision in Millerborg v. Blue Bonnet Trail LLC, 2025 WL 1994407 (July 16, 2025)³ has the potential to significantly change the prospects for defendants in these cases. The decision begins with the recognition that Laufer v Mann Hospitality is a crucial decision on standing in the Fifth Circuit and then considers the plaintiff’s allegations in light of that case. Judge Godbey ultimately concludes that the plaintiff’s complaint does not include sufficient detail for the Court to determine whether he “personally experienced (as opposed to merely observed)” the various supposed violations he encountered. The difference between experiencing a violation and seeing a violation is crucial because in Laufer v. Mann Hospitality the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that a disabled person might suffer a real harm just from seeing a condition that violated the law. Seeing a gate that is too narrow to meet FHA standards doesn’t cause a harm that gives rise to standing. Being impeded by narrowness of the gate does.

    While this is helpful, it is not hard for a tester plaintiff to claim there were at least a few violations that interfered with their access to the property, and Judge Godbey gave the plaintiff in Bluebonnet Trails a chance to amend and be more specific about what he personally experienced.  A person who is wheelchair bound can plausibly allege that a gate that does not meet FHA requirements hindered their access to some part of the apartment complex, and that is enough to allege a harm that would give rise to a claim for damages even if the amount were small.

    It is the next step in Judge Godbey’s analysis that can change the nature of FHA defense.  Turning from past injury to future injury ,Judge Godbey notes that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show a real or immediate threat of future injury in order to get injunctive relief. Millerborg does not claim (because it would not be true) that he wanted to lease an apartment. Without an plausible allegation that he would return in the future and might suffer an injury if things are not fixed Millerborg has failed to allege an immediate threat of a concrete harm. Therefore, according to Judge Godbey, Millerborg failed to plead any claim for injunctive relief.

    Once again, Millerborg can amend, but to see why that might not matter it is helpful to look at another decision from a judge in the Northern District of Texas. In Bowman v. SWBC Real Estate Services, Case No. 3:23-cv-00970 (N.D. Texas) I represent a group of defendants. I moved to dismiss the case based on standing, a motion granted by Judge Brantley Starr (4). Judge Starr began by dismissing claims that rested on discrimination in the rental of an apartment for the simple reason that Bowman did not allege an intent to rent. He then went on to consider the broader prohibition on discrimination in 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2). In this analysis Judge Starr distinguished the parts of the apartment complex open to the public and the parts that were intended only for tenants. Areas like the leasing office that were open to the public were “fair game” for a claim by someone like Bowman who never intended to rent. Those that were only for tenants were not, because of course only someone who wanted to rent an apartment would ever care about these areas.

    Turning back to Millerborg v. Blue Bonnet Trail, consider what the distinction between areas open to the public and areas only for tenants means in terms of injunctive relief. The threat in FHA design build cases is that the owner will have to spend a fortune on remediation if it turns out that dozens or hundreds of apartment units were all designed or built wrong and must be fixed. The threat represented by the cost of fixing public areas is much smaller, usually involving only a few parking spaces and perhaps one set of restrooms in the leasing office. If a plaintiff like Millerborg is not entitled to injunctive relief related to areas that are only for tenants the threat posed by the lawsuit is relatively small and the claims for injunctive relief can be (usually) made moot at a fairly small expense. That leaves the plaintiff and his attorney pursuing a case that will not justify a huge expenditure on attorney and expert fees and does not pose a huge risk to the defendants. This means the defendant can take the case to trial with a diminished risk of a truly terrible outcome. Being able to take a chance on trial is important because while a motion to dismiss must assume what the plaintiff alleges is true, at trial the plaintiff has to prove the allegations are true. It is one thing to plausibly allege you intend to go back to an a apartment complex when you never intended to rent an apartment. It is quite a different thing to persuade a judge or jury that you really will go back.

    The distinction drawn by Judge Starr between areas open to the public and areas only for tenants, combined with Judge Godbey’s holding that a plaintiff is only entitled to injunctive relief with respect to conditions that might cause them harm in the future should lead to the conclusion that in FHA tester cases the possibility of injunctive relief is limited to areas open to the public. That makes the litigation risk manageable.  Millerborg v. Blubonnet Trails is still just one district court opinion, but it creates a solid argument that other judges should find persuasive about why a tester may have standing to sue, but does not have standing to seek more than limited injunctive relief.

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    ¹ See my blog Transunion v Ramirez – has the Supreme Court put an end to cheap standing in ADA litigation? and others you can find by searching for “Transunion”

    ² See my blog Stigmatic Injury and Laufer v Looper 1 and Laufer v Looper 2.

    ³ Thanks to Rachel Barlotta of Baker Donelson for calling the case to my attention.

    (4) Bowman did file an amended complaint and my motion to dismiss that amended complaint is pending.


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  • HUD was wrong about pet deposits – it’s as simple as that.

    sad looking dog with caption "I need some emotional support."

    I’ve written quite a few times in the last decade about the absurdity of HUD’s position that landlords cannot charge a fee or deposit for an assistance or emotional support animal.¹ HUD’s position has never made sense because asking for the waiver of a fee or deposit is just another kind of accommodation claim that must be supported by a showing of a disability related need. I wrote those blogs before the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) making it clear that interpreting statutes and the constitution is the business of the courts, not regulatory agencies.  Before Loper Bright many courts deferred to statements by HUD as if they were binding or at least persuasive.  Loper Bright made it clear that the non-regulatory statements like HUD’s various guidances on accommodation requests are entitled to respect only if they have the power to persuade.

    On July 16, 2025 Judge Sarah Vance of the Eastern District of Louisiana considered whether HUD’s 2020 Notice concerning accommodations, and in particular pet fees met that standard² in Henderson v. Five Properties, LLC, Case No. 2:24-cv-00750 (July 16, 2025). (4) HUD’s approach to fees in the 2020 Notice is that they are not appropriate in any instance, no matter how reasonable or proportional and regardless of the circumstances of the requesting party. As authority HUD cited a 2004 Joint Statement on Reasonable Accommodations that discussed “extra fees and deposits” that might be charged for an accommodation. Judge Vance notes that this 2004 document does not explain or provide authority for its statement. She notes:

    “The Joint Statement is unpersuasive . . . because its consideration is not thorough, and it presents no reasoning to evaluate.”

    Moving from the 2004 Joint Statement to the 2020 Notice, Judge Vance notes that in the 2020 Notice HUD claims the 2004 Joint Statement is persuasive because later courts relied on it. However, the cases HUD cites in the 2020 Notice are not cases about pet fees, so they really prove nothing. A third case that mentioned the 2004 Joint Statement was not persuasive because it did not rely on the 2004 Joint Statement, concerned a different issue, and ultimately found only that there was a unresolved fact question about the specific case. Judge Vance also rejected other arguments that supposedly supported the 2004 Joint Statement. Her conclusion was that the 2020 Notice’s interpretations of the Fair Housing Act “do not contain the power to persuade.” Rejecting any absolute rule, Judge Vance found that whether waiver of an animal fee or deposit was required depended on a “fact specific . . . case by case determination.”

    At this point Judge Vance’s decision had reached the important conclusion that HUD’s 2020 Notice can safely be disregarded by a court looking at an animal or pet fee. That still leaves the question of what a plaintiff must prove to be entitled to waiver of an animal or pet fee. Judge Vance’s opinion is helpful on this as well. She finds that a plaintiff must prove that the requested accommodation is “is indispensable and essential to achieve ameliorative effects of her disability.”³ The plaintiff admitted that she could afford the fee if she was allowed to pay in installments, something the landlord had already offered. If she could afford it then waiver of the fee was not at obstacle to keeping her dog, and was therefore not indispensable and essential. For landlords this provides an easy to apply test because most landlords require information about financial ability to pay rent. A tenant who can afford the rent can probably afford a one time fee and can almost certainly afford the fee when it is broken into installments.

    On its face Judge Vance’s opinion  applies only to the specific guidance on pet fees contained in the 2020 Notice, but her application of Loper Bright means the opinion has importance beyond pet fees. It is fair to say that HUD’s 2020 Notice, like many of HUD’s other guidance documents, was issued based more on what HUD would have liked to be the law than any analysis of either the law or the science concerning assistance animals. The simple question –  “is there any support for HUD’s position that would make it persuasive” – will only rarely be answered “yes.” Loper Bright’s message that the courts are not obliged to follow unsupported HUD guidances is one that will almost always help landlords and other housing providers in dealing wiht animal accommodation requests.

    If you want to know more about emotional support animals and the Fair Housing Act and other federal laws mark your calendar for October 8, 2025 at 2:00 p.m. eastern time when I’m presenting a one hour webinar, “Fact, Fantasy and Fraud, Emotional Support Animals under the Fair Housing Act.” Details will be announced as the date approaches.

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    ¹ See, “Unconventional Wisdom” from 2014, “Good News” from 2017, and  Georgia Court of Appeals from 2023.

    ² The guidance in question is HUD’s “Notice of Assessing a Person’s Request to Have an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation under the Fair Housing Act,” FHEO 2020-01, (January 28, 2020).  I wrote about this document in “HUD’s new Guidance on assistance animals will encourage emotional support animal fraud” a prediction that has proven true.

    ³ That standard was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Women’s Elevated Sober Living L.L.C. v. City of Plano, Texas, 86 F.4th 1108, 1112 (5th Cir. 2023).

    (4) In the interest of full disclosure I have an interest in this decision and the lawsuit because the “attorney” referred to on page 3 of the Opinion was me.


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  • Just a few quick notes on ADA website lawsuits.

    I noted this headline in my Google news feed this afternoon: “Attorney involved in dozens of ‘sue-and-settle’ lawsuits around KC may have web accessibility issues on his own sites.” The story was pretty much as expected. Attorney Kevin Puckett files 90 lawsuits for a single plaintiff who claims to be disabled. The attorney’s own website is reported to be not WCAG 2.1 conforming, but I suppose his client won’t sue him – why bite the hand that feeds you? You can draw your own conclusions about a lawyer who claims to be an advocate for those who are disabled but doesn’t make his own websites accessible. There are a couple of surprises. First, as the local news reports: “KMBC has learned Myers [the plaintiff] lives on Puckett’s [the lawyer’s] family property and rents a trailer from Puckett’s relatives.” That’s an interesting relationship. Second, the local news reports that cases filed by Puckett have settled for as much as $40,000. The going rate for ADA website settlements is between $2500 and around $15,000, with top dollar going to a few firms in New York and Pennsylvania who have been in the business for a long time and have a demonstrated ability to prosecute the cases through trial. There are many reasons to hire a lawyer who specializes in ADA defense, but perhaps the most important is that knowing the going rate for settlement can save a lot of money. ADA website cases often look scary, with high remediation costs and the potential for even higher legal fees. I can’t read Mr. Puckett’s mind or know his intentions, but in my experience over the last ten years most plaintiff’s attorneys are just trying to make a quick buck and will be happy to make a handsome profit off a few hours work. Knowing that can make all the difference.

    You can read the original news story here:  Kansas ADA lawsuits.

    Just as I hit “publish” on this blog I got another headline, this from a law firm website: “ADA Defense Lawyer: A big win against abusive ADA lawsuits. Recovering Attorney’s Fees in ADA and Unruh Act Cases.” The blog describes what amounts to a total victory for the defendant, whose lawyers, Stuart Tubis and Martin Orlick, were awarded more than $57,000 for winning at trial and an additional $84,000 for winning the appeal. It is very difficult to win defense fees in ADA and Unruh Act cases, so they clearly did a good job of showing the plaintiff was not just wrong, but acted in bad faith.

    If you have been sued under the ADA and are willing to spend more than a hundred and fifty thousand dollars winning then I would like to be your lawyer, but what I said about settlements above is important for those clients who just want to get out of a lawsuit that probably never should have been filed. You don’t have to take a case to trial or spend tens of thousands of dollars to get a settlement that is really annoying but cheaper than fighting. We need clients like the defendant in the above case who will take it upon themselves to remind serial filers that industrial litigation has risks, just as we need lawyers who will take the case and win. But what most businesses need is a lawyer who will tell them that the best way out may be a quick settlement.

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  • AI and ADA compliance for websites – what does “equality” mean for accessibility?

    Artificial Intelligence, or at least talk about AI, has become inescapable. Like “gluten free” it has been become a marketing tool that doesn’t mean anything. Gluten free toilet paper? – I’m sure somebody is selling it. AI powered paper clips? If not today then certainly tomorrow.

    Nonetheless, AI is real in the sense that computers can be programmed to do things that look a lot like intelligence. The term “AI” doesn’t have any well defined meaning, so the initials are  far less important than the capabilities of any particular so-called AI system. Whether you think “generative AI” is really intelligent or not, there is no doubt ChatGPT can turn out a poorly written essay much more quickly than a typical college student, and if your goal is to get a solid “C” while still having time to party then ChatGPT and its competitors have all the capability you need. If, on the other hand, your goal is polished prose that can persuade and educate you will probably find that generative AI is pretty dumb.

    That brings us to AI and accsss to the internet. “Accessible” for websites, applications, electronic documents and the like is defined for most purposes by the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), which consists of a short set of principles and a long list of rules that a website or application should satisfy to be accessible. Beyond that are thousands of technical descriptions of how to accomplish what the rules require. Even before AI became the phrase of the hour computers were really good at following rules because applying rules and finding rule violations lends itself to the algorithmic processes at the core of how all computers operate. Programs that scan a website for failures to follow WCAG have been around for many years, and the step from finding a rule violation to fixing the rule violation is tediously complex but straightforward. Doing tasks that are tediously complex but straightforward is where computers shine.¹
    Unfortunately, there is a significant gap between accessibility rules and equal use and enjoyment. Whether access is equal depends on two things that software cannot readily discern from simply scanning the code behind a website looking for WCAG rule violations. These are the purpose of the owner in creating the website and the goal of the disabled person who is trying to use the website. To take my favorite example, many websites make money by allowing (for a price) the display of advertisements. Those advertisements often take the form of click bait – pictures with captions that the advertiser hopes will induce the viewer to click and go to another site displaying advertisements. The purpose of the picture is to make you click – hence the name click bait.
    WCAG has a rule about pictures:”All non-text content that is presented to the user has a text alternative that serves the equivalent purpose.” It is easy for software to detect a picture – non-text content – by scanning the code behind a website. It is harder but certainly doable to scan the image itself and identify in general terms what it is – a dog, or a person or a car. Eventually the software will become sufficiently sophisticated to go further – the dog is a german shepherd or the car is a 1994 Toyota 4Runner. But describing the picture has nothing to do with its purpose, which is to induce a click. For software to generate text that “serves an equivalent purpose” it would need to know the purpose of the website owner/advertiser (click bait) and then generate alternative text likely to induce a click by a blind person using a screen reader. I have an antique car and often visit websites with information about antique cars. The click-bait images these display are either car parts or women wearing revealing clothes and a caption like “ten wardrobe fails you have to see.” I know what the advertisers think of the antique car demographic, and perhaps these generate clicks. It is hard, however, to imagine a person who is blind being tempted to click a picture with alternative text hinting at more pictures of scantily clad women. And since click bait is mostly an annoyance it isn’t clear a blind user would even want to hear a text description.
    There is another kind of purpose that AI is unlikely to discern. I recently visited a website whose background image was a collection of young, smiling and very diverse group of people sitting around a table laughing and talking. To me the message was clear: “buy our product and you will be like these attractive young people having fun” combined with “our products are for everyone, regardless of ethnicity or national origin or disability status.”  It isn’t hard to imagine AI generating a description of the picture as a group of people, but less easy to see how AI could generate alternative text conveying the message I got in an instant. Equally important, even if a very sophisticated program generated a sufficiently detailed description to accomplish the purpose or that image it would probably be an annoyance to a blind user who has to listen to all those words. A picture is worth a thousand words, but while sighted users can glance and the turn away a screen reader user has to read all the words. Even at the high text reading speed experienced screen reader users employ that would be tedious, especially for a picture of secondary importance. In short, making the picture “accessible” as defined by WCAG would make the website less accessible for screen reader users.
    Of course images create special communication problems for those who are blind just as sounds create special communication problems for those who are deaf.² There is, however, a deeper problem with accessibility created through the application of rules.  Following a complete set of rules may make a website “accessible” in some theoretical fashion, but practical accessibility requires consideration of the limitations and abilities of whatever assistive technology a disabled user relies on.  Title III of the ADA forbids discrimination in “in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” For physical accessibility this means a disabled user can get in, get around, and buy, sell or otherwise do what they came to do. That in turn means, for example, putting in ramps instead of steps for wheelchair users. It also means, because wheelchair users and other with mobility disabilities do not move as easily, that at least some of the accessible parking for those ramps be close to the front door. Equality of enjoyment requires some special treatment, like an up close parking space. Because I am not disabled I could not say what different treatment might be required to create equality of use and enjoyment of a website, but I’m reasonably sure that merely making sure every part of a website is accessible does not guarantee equality of use and enjoyment and that even if AI is capable of both identifying and correcting WCAG errors it won’t be able to go beyond that and think about what it feels like to use assistive technology and what changes in design might be needed to go from mere accessibility to genuine equality of use and enjoyment. It is also difficult to imagine how AI would implement the proper compromise between that which improves equality of access for the disabled and that which makes a website less usable by a person without a disability.
    This is only a sliver of the discussion that needs to be taking place about accessibility and the internet. There is, for example, the fact that creating accessible websites is so expensive that small businesses and hobbyists cannot afford to so but are still held to the same standards as the largest multi-nationals. There is the complicated question of whether website inaccessibility should be addressed only by looking at websites, or whether, perhaps, the creators of assistive technology have some responsibility for improving the capabilities of their products so as to overcome WCAG errors. (4) At the end of the though, as long as websites are owned by humans and used by humans it seems unlikely AI will be more than a part of solution for accessibility and, that it may well be a distraction from accomplishing the harder work of creating equality of use and enjoyment.
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    ¹ I’m not suggesting that those who create computer software are not creative – building complex systems that work efficiently is not straightforward. But the end result will always be a series of commands that execute a well defined process to turn some input into a different output.
    ² I cannot image that the open captions describing music that you can activate on a television come close to eliciting the emotions of the music itself.
    ³ Jason Taylor at Usablenet deserves any credit for this insight, but not any blame if I have misstated the idea.
    (4) For example, if AI tools can scan a website to identify missing alternative text and supply the missing text there would not appear to be any reason a screen reader program could not incorporate the same technology and make the user less dependent on the website owners and developers.

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  • There was an old woman who swallowed a spider – reforming California’s Unruh Act

    Update – well, in the fast moving world of the internet it looks like this blog is out of date because the California bill it discusses is unlikely to pass. Nonetheless, the princinciple still applies – it’s easy to legislate and hard to fix the unintended consequences.

    In the children’s nonsense song written by Burl Ives an old woman swallows a fly for reasons unknown and then:

    • swallows a spider to catch the fly
    • swallows a bird to catch the spider
    • swallows a cat to catch the bird
    • swallows a dog to catch the cat
    • swallows a goat to catch the dog
    • swallows a cow to catch the goat
    • and finally, swallows a horse to catch the cow

    at which point “she died of course.” Senate Bill 84, just passed by the California legislature, reminds me quite a bit of this song, for it is only the latest in a long line of failed efforts to curb the industrial litigation problem exacerbated by the Unruh Act.

    In its original form California’s Unruh Act included a state equivalent of the Americans with Disabilities Act concerning physical accessibility. However, it added something that is not in the ADA, an automatic $4,000 penalty paid to the plaintiff if a violation was proved. This created California’s industrial ADA litigation machine by incentivizing litigation. In other states the only threat to a defendant besides being ordered to remediate is paying legal fees to the plaintiff’s lawyer. In California it has been legal fees plus $4,000. It even seemed, for a while, that it might be $4,000 per violation.

    Not surprisingly, California soon had more accessibility lawsuits than any other state and California businesses; especially smaller businesses with fewer financial resources, faced an unrelenting series of lawsuits about accessibility. You might say California swallowed a fly, although unlike the old woman in the song there was a reason for it.

    Within a few years the California legislature realized that its effort to incentivize enforcement had created a monster that was not improving accessibility but was terrorizing small businesses. In recent years it has taken steps to slay the dragon it created, including a notice requirement, new pleading requirements, a higher filing fee for serial plaintiffs and a smaller penalty – $2,000 – under some circumstances. This had no noticeable effect on the volume of cases filed because most Unruh Act claims were joined with an ADA claim and filed in federal court, where the state court filing fee and pleading requirements did not apply. The spider intended to catch the fly was wriggling and tiggling (as the song says) but despite the addition of a bird, cat and dog the problem had not been solved.

    While the California legislature was taking these steps the federal courts realized that they were being used both as a money making tool for lawyers who did not seem to care about accessibility and then as a loophole to evade what the California legislature intended with its various reforms of the Unruh Act. Most (not all) federal courts in California began dismissing state law claims joined to a federal ADA claims. That meant no state law penalty and less incentive to file suit. You might say that without help from the California legislature the federal courts had swallowed a goat in the hope of putting ADA litigation back on track as a tool to eliminate discrimination instead of a means of enriching lawyers.

    The plaintiffs’ bar, with the endless creativity inspired by the desire to make money, began pivoting to the state courts where, for procedural reasons, it was harder and therefore more expensive for defendants to raise issues about the new pleading standard.  The federal procedural goat couldn’t get rid of the dog any better than the spider etc. got rid of the fly. Federal courts began to see a reduction in the huge volume of ADA cases but the problem for business remained the same as did the underlying cause – a financial incentive that made industrial litigation profitable for lawyers.

    With Senate Bill 84 the California Senate is hoping that by swallowing a cow it might take down the ineffective goat and give small businesses a break. The law requires 120 days notice and an opportunity to cure before an Unruh Act lawsuit is filed against a business with 50 or fewer employees. The penalty for failing to give notice is a losing the chance to win statutory damages and legal fees. This seems, on its face, the perfect solution. It makes it much harder for lawyers to get the attorneys’ fees and penalties that created the litigation monster in the first place, which should tame the monster.

    I am not optimistic that this particular evil genie can ever be returned to its bottle.¹ The foundation on which ADA and Unruh Act industrial litigation rests is the asymmetrical nature of the risks and rewards from such litigation. Under both the ADA and Unruh Act a winning plaintiff will be awarded attorneys’ fees but a winning defendant will get nothing. For a plaintiff’s lawyer there is a low risk (a few hundred dollars in filing expense) and a large potential reward (thousands of dollars in attorneys fees). For the defendant there is only risk. If the defendant wins they lose all the money they spent on their attorneys. If they lose they pay their attorney and the plaintiff’s attorney. While the Unruh Act’s penalty provision certainly made California the hotbed of accessibility litigation it is today, it is the asymmetry of risk and reward that supports the industrial ADA litigation machine across the nation.

    What about the 120 day notice and cure provision? Surely that gives small businesses a chance to fix their problems and therefore avoid a lawsuit. There are three problems here. First, of course, the federal ADA remains unchanged. Second, depending on the business and the nature of the accessibility problems 120 days may be too short a time and the cost may be more than the business can afford. Defendants in ADA/Unruh Act lawsuits are very often small businesses occupying the cheapest available space in aging strip shopping centers. They are often run by recent immigrants or their children.³  For a marginally profitable business that survives only because the whole family works, the cost of remediation may be beyond reach. This is especially true for the most common violations, which involve accessible parking. Existing guidance suggests that any substantial work on a parking space may trigger an obligation to remediate the entire parking lot, which multiplies the expense. Finally, when remediation work requires complex permitting 120 days may not be long enough, even assuming the labor required is available. There are a good reasons why so many businesses in California that are hit with an Unruh Act or ADA claim simply allow a default judgment to be taken or close down entirely.

    No doubt a few years down the road we’ll see another legislative effort at the state or federal level to make adjustments that discourage litigation. Once you’ve swallowed a cow, why not try a horse? The problem is that no amount of fiddling can solve the fundamental problems that create industrial ADA litigation. The first is the asymmetry in cost and risk when a plaintiff who has nothing to lose except a little time and expense sues a defendant whose absolutely best outcome is paying their own attorney thousands or tens of thousands of dollars that cannot be recovered. The second is the fact that in most cases remediation costs money but does not improve revenues or profitability, making remediation difficult or impossible for small businesses.² Finally, those small businesses are likely to occupy the oldest buildings and therefore most likely to have accessibility violations.

    We don’t need to throw the baby out with the bath water¹, but creating a more accessible world and reducing litigation will require solutions that don’t just involve tinkering around with notice requirements and providing an opportunity to cure. The existing model of trying to encourage accessibility by incentivizing litigation and punishing businesses that are not accessible has been a complete failure as applied to small businesses in aging buildings. The number of ADA accessibility cases filed each year has not gone down for decades, which is proof enough that the existing system of incentives and punishments does not work. What happened to the old lady who swallowed a horse? “She died, of course.” After more than three decades of failures the California legislature and the Congress need to find real solutions to the problem of accessibility.(4)

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    Thanks to Jim Vitale for pointing out this new legislation. You can read more about the details at Ogletree Deakin’s article on JD Supra, “California Senate Passes

    ¹ Mixing metaphors is the author’s prerogative.

    ² There are tax incentives for remediation, but they don’t apply to buildings built after 1991, and are therefore of little use to most defendants. More important, we know that most accessibility litigation concerns problems that do not have a significant impact on real disabled customers. Businesses would invest in remediation voluntarily if they thought it would improve revenues. Real customers, rather than serial filers, would enforce the Unruh Act and ADA if they believed they were being denied meaningful access. Even allowing for ignorance and misconceptions the real problem with accessibility is that the cost outweighs the benefit when measured in purely economic terms, and most of those with disabilities would rather live their lives and simply do business with those that are accessible. Accessibility is an important social good, but forcing individual businesses to bear the cost of that social good is likely to fail when there is no obvious dollar benefit to the business itself.

    ³ There is considerable evidence that the law firms in California and elsewhere who file ADA claims deliberately seek out businesses likely to be owned by minorities or recent immigrants, sweeping through the local Chinatown or Koreatown while avoiding neighborhoods that are predominantly White.

    (4) I’m afraid these will probably involve spending taxpayer dollars, which is of course anathema in California and the U.S. as a whole. Everybody wants an accessible society, but nobody wants to pay for it.

    (5) See, Bill to Stop Shakedown ADA

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Richard Hunt, author