Accessibility Defense, Helping Business Avoid and Defend ADA and FHA Lawsuits

ADA and FHA Defense


  • What the ADA and FHA are all about.

    On December 5 (2025) I argued a fair housing case before the Connecticut Supreme Court. The details are important, but not for this blog.  I say that because during the argument it occurred to me that it is easy, while cataloging and describing all the trees in the forest to forget that it is a forest, not just a collection of trees. Today I’m going to step back and look at the FHA, ADA and other disabilities rights laws to remember what makes them different from other anti-discrimination laws and the reasons for those differences.

    Most anti-discrimination laws, including those concerning disabilities, are intended to forbid unequal treatment in political, social and economic life based on irrational distinctions with deep historical roots. Irrational distinctions are those based on untrue ideas about what people can and cannot do. We are not all equally smart, strong, or otherwise qualified to make good decisions at the ballot box or do this job or that, but that inequality is not related to the color of our skin, our religion, our national origin, our gender, or similar distinctions that once seemed to matter. This means it is irrational to prefer one race¹ over another in hiring, or to prefer one religion over another when renting an apartment. This can be put in moral and religious terms, but the underlying principle is that making distinctions based on things like skin color or ethnic origin is irrational, and that it is therefore harmful to a society that requires all the talents available from all its citizens.

    People with disabilities are, by definition, unequal in some respect. The blind cannot see, the deaf cannot hear, and those who suffer from mental disorders may not be able to perform some tasks in some situations.  At the same time, being disabled in one respect does not mean that a person lacks any other ability that might be required by a job or to otherwise participate in social and economic life. Blindness is not related to intelligence, deafness is not related to physical strength, and many mental disorders that interfere with some aspects of daily living have no effect on others. Whether a disability matters when making a decision can be difficult, especially when it comes to work. However, in the realm of participation in a consumer society or voting it is rare that any disability is relevant. Only in the case of some severe intellectual disabilities would a disabled person be unable to decide what they want to buy or where they want to live.

    So far, so good then. It should be and is illegal to discriminate against those with disabilities except in those cases where the disability is directly related to whatever it is they want to do.  But there is another problem with disability and equality; the difference between equality of treatment and equality of opportunity. The U.S. Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity, not equality of outcomes. Some will succeed, some will fail, some will be rich, some will be poor, some will be happy and some miserable. What the law guarantees is that everyone will have an equal opportunity to poor and miserable; or to be more positive, an equal opportunity to be rich and happy.

    The general premise of anti-discrimination laws is that if people are treated equally they will have equal opportunity.  The law cannot guarantee complete equality of treatment of course. Many studies have shown that taller men tend to be favored over shorter men for some executive positions and there is no doubt that those with better clothes, better manners and a prettier or more handsome face are often treated better than those who are poorly dressed or don’t meet our social conventions about what is attractive.  What the anti-discrimination laws do is attack the most invidious reasons for discrimination; things like race, religion, national origin and so forth. In every case the theory is the same; equal treatment despite membership in some group provides as much equality of opportunity as the law can reasonably guarantee.

    Unfortunately, a guarantee of equal treatment does not result in equality of opportunity for those who are disabled.  For example, a blind person with a guide dog cannot easily navigate without their dog. A “no dogs” policy in a store is the same for everyone, but the policy denies a blind person the equal opportunity to shop. Another example would be a “no reserved parking” policy in an apartment complex. On its face this creates the same inconvenience for everyone, but for a person whose disability makes it difficult to walk the policy might be more than just an inconvenience; it could deny them the equal opportunity to get into their apartment.

    To provide equal opportunity when equal treatment is not enough the FHA, ADA and other disabilities laws have what are generally called accommodation requirements. If the equal application of some rule or policy would result in unequal opportunity for those with disabilities, then the policy or rule must be waived or modified to permit equality of opportunity; or at least to permit as much equality as is possible given the disability.  Stores, landlords and others are not required to do something “unreasonable,” but in general they should be willing to change or waive their rules to permit someone with a disability to have an equal opportunity to buy, or rent, or even just walk around a public space. In other words, those with disabilities must be given special, unequal treatment as a way to provide equality of opportunity that their disability would otherwise deny them.

    This is where it becomes easy to start looking at the color of the bark and leaves and forget there is a forest. Regulatory agencies, courts and businesses love nice black and white rules. They want a clear answer to questions like: “Is a person suffering from major depressive disorder entitled to waiver of a no pets policy?” Yes or no, please, because no one likes complicated questions. Although it was recently withdrawn, in 2020 HUD published a guidance on when animals were a required accommodation that tried so hard to both provide easy to apply rules and still recognize that there are no easy to apply rules that it ended up being incomprehensible gibberish.

    When it comes to accommodations the questions to ask are easy but the answers cannot be put in the form of simple rules. Here are the questions:

    First – is the person requesting an accommodation disabled as defined in the relevant statutes? In every case this means (a) do they have a mental or physical disorder that (b) substantially limits with a major life activity. “Disorder” is pretty easy because even a common cold is a physical disorder. “Substantially limits” is harder and the courts – who are the final arbiters of this kind of question – are not in perfect agreement. Also, the ADA and FHA have different definitions and the ADA covers more conditions than the FHA (although these generally come up only in employment cases).

    Second – does the disability in question interfere with the equal opportunity to use and enjoyment of a facility like a store, home, apartment, or public space? Remember that the general rule is equal treatment for all. The accommodation obligation – special treatment for a person with a disability – is only intended to provide equality of opportunity for those whose disabilities would prevent equality of opportunity. Having a disability isn’t a free pass for special treatment in general.

    This second rule gets complicated when you ask what it means to equally use and enjoy something. It is easy at this point to get deep into looking at the color of the bark on the trees, but there is one thing that is easy to say. “Enjoy” does not mean to have fun or feel good. It’s really the same thing as “use” when “use” isn’t the right word.  You use the kitchen in a house, you enjoy having a place to live that provides protection from the elements. You may be sad, anxious and depressed, but if your home provides the basic shelter and amenities provided for in the lease you are “enjoying” the apartment.

    Third – is the accommodation requested reasonable?  It isn’t hard to see that “reasonable” is a word that can mean different things to different people. There are various regulatory definitions of “reasonable” and the courts have weighed in, but what is reasonable depends on so many things that no rule will ever be satisfactory.

    Fourth – does the accommodation create a direct threat? Not so complicated, but if you think about it anything that creates a direct threat isn’t reasonable, so this question seems a little redundant.

    Now let’s get back to the forest. Even though answering these questions may be complicated in any specific case, and even though regulators and courts would like to find a bunch of easy to apply rules, it is important always to refer back to the basic principle of equality of opportunity.  Unless equality of opportunity is somehow limited by the disability in question there can never be a need for an accommodation because accommodations are only required when equality of opportunity is at issue.

    In my next blog we’ll get back to staring at bark and leaves.

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    ¹ It has to be noted here that “race” is a social construct usually based on appearance or origin; this is why it is an irrational basis for making choices about how to treat someone. A hundred years ago it was common to speak of the “English race” or the “German race” as if there were genetic differences that drove ability or conduct. Notions of “race” have gradually narrowed in most of the world to the idea that skin color defines a “race,” but “race” is still a social construct with no basis in genetic reality.

    ² There has been lots of silly commentary about how a “no pets” policy would not prohibit a guide dog or other animal because these animals are not “pets.” What it means for an animal to be a “pet” is not a sound basis for making decisions about disability rights, so we can stick to the real problem, which is a prohibition on animals.

    ³ One of the things everyone expects as part of the use and enjoyment of their home is that they can get dressed and go out in the world from their front door. A blind person who relies on a guide dog cannot do that without their dog; hence to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy an apartment or house they must have their dog living with them.


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  • Emotional Support Animals, Fact, Fantasy and Fiction

    My webinar Emotional Support Animals Under the FHA – Fact, Fantasy, and Fraud (Update) is now available live from Lawline. The news covered in my last blog and other actions by the Trump Administration have important consequences for landlords, management companies, owners associations and other housing providers even while the underlying law and science remain largely unchanged.

     

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  • Disability Rights under the Trump Administration.

    Coming on the heels of my presentation of this title (available at Trump and Disability Rights) HUD and Senator Elizabeth Warren have both made significant announcements about fair housing enforcement.

    On September 17 HUD announced that it was withdrawing a number of guidance documents, including FHEO 2013-01 and 2020-01 and concerning assistance animals. These guidances were never a model of clarity and were in some cases inconsistent with the law,¹ so housing providers will not be sorry to see them go. However, the confusion they caused was important only because it reflected HUD’s attitude toward assistance animals in its investigations, and for the rest of this administration, at least, HUD has more or less bowed out of the fair housing enforcement business. The September 17 announcement  includes HUD’s statement that it is now “Prioritizing cases with actual, provable instances of discrimination.” ESA and other accommodation cases are not easy to prove, and of course HUD’s 70% reduction in its fair housing investigations staff won’t make enforcement any easier.

    That is the point of Senator Warren’s demand for an investigation into HUD’s fair housing enforcement. Based on allegations by whistleblowers within HUD Senator Warren wants HUD’s inspector general to investigate claims it is not enforcing fair housing laws. This investigation of HUD by HUD seems doomed from the start but the back and forth between HUD and fair housing advocates like Senator Warren points out two underlying problems with HUD’s enforcement of the disability discrimination provisions in the Fair Housing Act. The first is simply that fair housing enforcement is not cheap. HUD’s cuts to its investigative staff were part of a gigantic across the board budget cut that doesn’t seem to have been aimed at disability rights any more than it was aimed at other HUD initiatives.  Even the most impartial investigation might conclude that HUD simply no longer has the money to enforce the law.

    The second is that HUD has not proven especially good at dealing with animal accommodation requests. FHEO 2020-01 was almost incomprehensible because HUD was wrestling with problems it did not have the expertise to handle, including questions about the effectiveness of emotional support animals and the definition of “handicap” under the Fair Housing Act. HUD’s attitude, at least until this administration, was that claims of handicap were prima facie true, as were claims that emotional support animals were necessary for equality of housing opportunity. Courts require evidence; HUD was content with allegations, in part because HUD is not an agency with in-house expertise in the diagnosis of mental disorders or in the science of human-animal interactions. This is unlikely to change under this administration, which has little inclination to listen to experts anyway.

    For housing providers the news remains unchanged because the law remains unchanged. The risk of HUD enforcement in ESA cases is lower because of changes in policy and budget, and for the next three years or so housing providers can take a more aggressive approach to the evaluation of ESA requests without risking an expensive investigatory process. That general observation has to be tempered with the knowledge that private enforcement is still available and expensive to defend. Housing providers should not assume they can deny every request now that HUD is more or less out of the picture; instead they should continue to follow what has always been the best policy: evaluate each claim for accommodation on its merits, develop a record of reasonableness in responses to such claims, and deny claims based on their merit and the risk of litigation.

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    ¹ See my blog HUD Guidance will encourage fraud.

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  • The Trump Administration and Disability Rights

    My webinar on The Trump Administration and Disability rights is now available on Lawline. You can find it a Lawline.com, a good place to find my earlier seminars:

    FHA and ADA Accessibility Requirements: What Every Lawyer Needs to Know

    and

    Your Office is a Public Accommodation: What Professionals Need to Know About the ADA

    You will also want to check out my upcoming webinar: Emotional Support Animals Under the FHA – Fact, Fantasy, and Fraud (Update),  which will stream live on October 7 at 1:00 p.m. CDT.

     

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  • FHA tester standing – the beginning of the beginning of the end?

    Even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Transunion¹ and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Laufer v Mann Hospitality,² challenging the standing of a Fair Housing Act tester in Texas has been a hit or miss proposition depending very much on which District Judge decided the case. It has been quite possible to file almost identical motions to dismiss concerning almost identical complaints and get opposite results. The underlying uncertainty has several sources. First, the only attorney actively filing FHA tester cases in Texas, Eric Calhoun, has gathered a substantial list of decisions denying motions to dismiss based on standing, and while a decision by one district judge does not bind the others, it is hard for any district judge to simply ignore a dozen decisions by their peers. Added to this is the lack of circuit level authority on FHA standing. Transunion was not an FHA case and neither was Laufer v. Mann Hospitality, making it easy to argue that FHA cases are different, especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman is the leading case on tester standing and was decided under the FHA. It has been widely misunderstood and misused, but it certainly supports an argument that a plaintiff tester can have standing in an FHA case. Finally, the FHA provides a damage remedy and there is some case law suggesting a person with a disability suffers compensable damages by merely encountering an FHA violation. That means even a tester with no intent to rent can at least claim damages. And from it is only a short step from any standing at all to cases suggesting a federal judge has  broad power to enter injunctions to cure design and construction violations.

    That last step is why Judge Godbey’s decision in Millerborg v. Blue Bonnet Trail LLC, 2025 WL 1994407 (July 16, 2025)³ has the potential to significantly change the prospects for defendants in these cases. The decision begins with the recognition that Laufer v Mann Hospitality is a crucial decision on standing in the Fifth Circuit and then considers the plaintiff’s allegations in light of that case. Judge Godbey ultimately concludes that the plaintiff’s complaint does not include sufficient detail for the Court to determine whether he “personally experienced (as opposed to merely observed)” the various supposed violations he encountered. The difference between experiencing a violation and seeing a violation is crucial because in Laufer v. Mann Hospitality the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that a disabled person might suffer a real harm just from seeing a condition that violated the law. Seeing a gate that is too narrow to meet FHA standards doesn’t cause a harm that gives rise to standing. Being impeded by narrowness of the gate does.

    While this is helpful, it is not hard for a tester plaintiff to claim there were at least a few violations that interfered with their access to the property, and Judge Godbey gave the plaintiff in Bluebonnet Trails a chance to amend and be more specific about what he personally experienced.  A person who is wheelchair bound can plausibly allege that a gate that does not meet FHA requirements hindered their access to some part of the apartment complex, and that is enough to allege a harm that would give rise to a claim for damages even if the amount were small.

    It is the next step in Judge Godbey’s analysis that can change the nature of FHA defense.  Turning from past injury to future injury ,Judge Godbey notes that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show a real or immediate threat of future injury in order to get injunctive relief. Millerborg does not claim (because it would not be true) that he wanted to lease an apartment. Without an plausible allegation that he would return in the future and might suffer an injury if things are not fixed Millerborg has failed to allege an immediate threat of a concrete harm. Therefore, according to Judge Godbey, Millerborg failed to plead any claim for injunctive relief.

    Once again, Millerborg can amend, but to see why that might not matter it is helpful to look at another decision from a judge in the Northern District of Texas. In Bowman v. SWBC Real Estate Services, Case No. 3:23-cv-00970 (N.D. Texas) I represent a group of defendants. I moved to dismiss the case based on standing, a motion granted by Judge Brantley Starr (4). Judge Starr began by dismissing claims that rested on discrimination in the rental of an apartment for the simple reason that Bowman did not allege an intent to rent. He then went on to consider the broader prohibition on discrimination in 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2). In this analysis Judge Starr distinguished the parts of the apartment complex open to the public and the parts that were intended only for tenants. Areas like the leasing office that were open to the public were “fair game” for a claim by someone like Bowman who never intended to rent. Those that were only for tenants were not, because of course only someone who wanted to rent an apartment would ever care about these areas.

    Turning back to Millerborg v. Blue Bonnet Trail, consider what the distinction between areas open to the public and areas only for tenants means in terms of injunctive relief. The threat in FHA design build cases is that the owner will have to spend a fortune on remediation if it turns out that dozens or hundreds of apartment units were all designed or built wrong and must be fixed. The threat represented by the cost of fixing public areas is much smaller, usually involving only a few parking spaces and perhaps one set of restrooms in the leasing office. If a plaintiff like Millerborg is not entitled to injunctive relief related to areas that are only for tenants the threat posed by the lawsuit is relatively small and the claims for injunctive relief can be (usually) made moot at a fairly small expense. That leaves the plaintiff and his attorney pursuing a case that will not justify a huge expenditure on attorney and expert fees and does not pose a huge risk to the defendants. This means the defendant can take the case to trial with a diminished risk of a truly terrible outcome. Being able to take a chance on trial is important because while a motion to dismiss must assume what the plaintiff alleges is true, at trial the plaintiff has to prove the allegations are true. It is one thing to plausibly allege you intend to go back to an a apartment complex when you never intended to rent an apartment. It is quite a different thing to persuade a judge or jury that you really will go back.

    The distinction drawn by Judge Starr between areas open to the public and areas only for tenants, combined with Judge Godbey’s holding that a plaintiff is only entitled to injunctive relief with respect to conditions that might cause them harm in the future should lead to the conclusion that in FHA tester cases the possibility of injunctive relief is limited to areas open to the public. That makes the litigation risk manageable.  Millerborg v. Blubonnet Trails is still just one district court opinion, but it creates a solid argument that other judges should find persuasive about why a tester may have standing to sue, but does not have standing to seek more than limited injunctive relief.

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    ¹ See my blog Transunion v Ramirez – has the Supreme Court put an end to cheap standing in ADA litigation? and others you can find by searching for “Transunion”

    ² See my blog Stigmatic Injury and Laufer v Looper 1 and Laufer v Looper 2.

    ³ Thanks to Rachel Barlotta of Baker Donelson for calling the case to my attention.

    (4) Bowman did file an amended complaint and my motion to dismiss that amended complaint is pending.

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