I blogged last year about the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Magee v. Coca–Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 531 (5th Cir. 2016) (ADA and the Internet – what non-internet cases can tell us.) as well as the District Court’s similar holding (Vending Machines and the ADA). It looked like an interesting case, and it seems the Supreme Court may agree. As reported by Dan Fisher in Forbes (Supreme Court asks government if a Coke machine must be ADA compliant),* on February 27 the Supreme Court docketed a request to the Solicitor General for input on Magee’s pending petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court’s ADA decisions have focused almost exclusively on employment and education, not business accessibility, and while certiorari has not been granted, this request shows unusual interest in this aspect of the ADA. More
ADA Vending Machines
By Richard Hunt in Accessibility Litigation Trends, ADA Internet, ADA Internet Web, ADA Vending Machines, ADA Web Access, Internet Tags: ADA Internet, ADA vending machines, ADA web, Coca Cola ADA, internet accessibility, Magee v Coca Cola
“In deciding that Coca–Cola’s vending machines in the instant case are not places of public accommodation, we acknowledge the limits of our holding. As the district court recognized, those vending machines may very well be subject to various requirements under the ADA by virtue of their being located in a hospital or a bus station, both of which are indisputably places of public accommodation. Here, however, Magee sued only Coca–Cola, an entity that does not own, lease (or lease to), or operate a place of public accommodation.”
Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 2016 WL 4363306, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016).
Last month the Fifth Circuit confirmed a lower court decision finding that vending machines were not public accommodations and that by themselves they are not required to be accessible. The reasoning was very similar to that in the Netflix and Target cases from the Ninth Circuit. Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit found that a “public accommodation” means a physical store or similar facility where one buys goods or services. A website (in Netflix) or a vending machine (in Magee) might be a service of a public accommodation, in which case the public accommodation may be required to make it accessible. By itself, however, a website or vending machine is not a public accommodation. Standing alone it is not required to be accessible because it is simply not covered by the ADA.
The same kind of argument led to a similar result in Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 647 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2011). The issue in Harris was whether voting machines were required to be accessible. The Court found they were not because the machines themselves were not public accommodations.
A completely different view appears in cases like Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) that focus less on the definition of public accommodation and more on the notion that goods and services should be accessible. These courts tend to view a distinction based on how goods or services may be purchased as irrational. Buying on the web or by phone shouldn’t be any different than buying in a physical store, at least with respect to accessibility. Carparts was a pre-internet case dealing with telephone transactions, but it resembles recent cases like Scribd that make the same argument.
The position of the Department of Justice lines up with that of the First Circuit in Carparts, even though its regulatory definitions of words like “facility” would seem to support McGee. At the end of the day though the day the courts will decide just what the ADA covers.
What we see in the contrast between McGee and Carparts is competing views of the ADA, with McGee representing courts who believe Congress applied the ADA only to public accommodations because it is focused on physical accessibility, while Carparts reflects the views of those courts and the Department of Justice who see the ADA as a broad mandate for accessibility regardless of its specific language. These views cannot be reconciled, and while the question of internet accessibility tends to dominate today’s discussion of the ADA, it is worthwhile to remember that cases about vending machines and telephone services will also help define the law in individual circuits – at least until the Supreme Court is finally given a chance to weigh in on the subject.
NOTE: for earlier blogs on this subject, click on the ADA Web Access category to the left.
By Richard Hunt in Accessibility Litigation Trends, ADA Point of Sale, ADA Vending Machines, Hospitality, Public Facilities Tags: ADA, NAMA, National Automatic Merchandising Association, Point of Sale, Vending Machines
Even after 25 years of regulation and litigation ADA obligations are still often uncertain. Does the ADA require that vending machines be accessible to the blind and if so what does that mean? It really isn’t clear at all.
In McGee v. Coca Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 2015 WL 6620959 (E.D. La. 2015) the court held definitively that a Coca Cola vending machine is not, by itself, a place of public accommodation covered by the ADA. It noted, however, that the bus station in which the machine was located was a place of public accommodation and might well be obligated to provide accessible vending machines. The case was decided early, so there is no guidance as to what accessible means. More